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Does the Sixth Amendment Demand
That Co-Conspiring Witnesses
Reveal Their Plea Bargains?
Marisa C. Maleckt
INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the right of an accused individual in a criminal prosecution
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 At the heart
of the Confrontation Clause is the ability to secure for the
defendant the opportunity for cross-examination. 2 The Supreme
Court has recognized that an important function of cross-
examination is to expose a witness's motivation for testifying.3
This is an especially important function when a co-conspirator of
the defendant standing trial agrees to testify against the defen-
dant in exchange for a reduced sentence of his or her own. A trial
court cannot prohibit all inquiry into the possibility that the co-
conspirator of the defendant has an incentive to lie in this con-
text because a reasonable jury could find that a dismissal or re-
duction of pending criminal charges furnishes a co-conspiring
witness with a motive for favoring the prosecution in his or her
testimony.4 A defendant's constitutional right is violated when
"he shows that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical
form of bias on the part of the witness."5 However, the question
remains whether there is a Confrontation Clause violation when
a trial court curtails some, but not all, of the inquiry into the de-
tails of the plea bargain between the co-conspiring witness and
t BA 2007, Amherst College; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law
School.
I US Const Amend VI.
2 See Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 315-16 (1974).
3 Id at 316-17, citing Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496 (1959).
4 See Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 (1986) (finding a violation of the
Confrontation Clause because all inquiry into the witness's motive for testifying had been
cut off).
5 Id at 680.
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the government. The federal appellate circuits disagree on
whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are violated
when the trial court bars the defendant from cross-examining co-
conspirator witnesses about the exact details regarding the sen-
tence they avoided by cooperating with the government. 6 Some
circuits are concerned that such cross-examination would alert
the jury to the mandatory minimum sentences faced by the
defendant because presumably the co-conspiring witness would
have faced the same sentence in the absence of the government
cooperation agreement. 7 These circuits seem to fear that a jury
will be encouraged to nullify if the jury is alerted to the defen-
dant's potential sentence and if the jury believes the sentence to
be too harsh.8
This split is reflective of the discretion trial judges have to
limit defense counsel's inquiry.9 Specifically, judges must balance
the probative value of and need for certain evidence against the
harm likely to result from its admission. 10 Federal Rule of
Evidence (FRE) 403 lays out the circumstances in which relevant
evidence can be excluded on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time. FRE 403 provides in part: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."11 Thus, the issue
to consider here is whether the probative value of understanding
a witness's incentive to lie outweighs the prejudicial harm of the
possibility of jury nullification. 12
This Comment will suggest that the split among the circuits
should be resolved by a bright-line rule. Namely, courts should
6 Contrast United States v Reid, 300 Fed Appx 50 (2d Cir 2008) (finding that the
Sixth Amendment is not violated when inquiry is curtailed); United States v Arocho, 305
F3d 627 (7th Cir 2002) (same), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in
United States v Rodriguez-Cardenas, 362 F3d 958 (7th Cir 2004); United States v Cropp,
127 F3d 354 (4th Cir 1997) (same); United States v Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d 1142 (1st
Cir 1995) (same); with United States v Larson, 495 F3d 1094 (9th Cir 2007) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment is violated when inquiry is curtailed); United States v Chandler,
326 F3d 210 (3d Cir 2003) (same).
7 See Reid, 300 Fed Appx at 52; Arocho, 305 F3d at 636; Cropp, 127 F3d at 358; and
Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d at 1153.
8 See, for example, Cropp, 127 F3d at 358 (mentioning jury nullification as the
prejudicial harm).
I See Van Arsdall, 475 US at 679 ("[Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned....").
10 See Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5
Vand L Rev 385, 392 (1952).
11 FRE 403.
12 See Van Arsdall, 475 US at 679 (considering the probative value/prejudicial harm
balance in a case concerning the Confrontation Clause).
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hold that the Sixth Amendment is violated when a judge bars the
defense from questioning the co-conspiring witness about the
details of his or her plea agreement with the government. I argue
that the probative value of understanding the witness's incentive
to lie outweighs the prejudicial harm of the possibility of jury
nullification, especially in light of the fact that judges can mini-
mize the potential for jury nullification by taking certain steps
that do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
This issue has particular salience during our current reces-
sion. Plea bargains are a predictable response to shrinking state
and federal prosecutorial and judicial budgets because they are
both inexpensive and efficient. 13 Given the predictable rise in
plea deals, resolution of this circuit split through a bright-line
rule would lead to more efficient use of judicial resources.' 4 A
bright-line rule gives certainty to courts, reducing the time that
judges spend weighing this issue, reducing the work of appellate
courts, and reducing the work for government prosecutors during
appeals. Moreover, a bright-line rule increases predictability and
allows prosecutors to appropriately value their plea deals.
Part I of this Comment reviews the major case law sur-
rounding the circuit split regarding whether the Sixth Amend-
ment demands that co-conspiring witnesses reveal the exact de-
tails of their plea bargains. Part II suggests that the other cir-
cuits' solutions are insufficient, and that a deeper understanding
of jury nullification is required. I conclude with my solution that
the probative value of understanding the witness's incentive to
lie outweighs the prejudicial harm of the possibility of jury nulli-
fication, especially in light of the fact that judges can minimize
the potential for jury nullification by taking certain steps that do
not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part I of this Comment summarizes the various approaches
advocated by each circuit. Part I.A-D details the positions of the
First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which have all held
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated when a judge cur-
13 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 607-08 (Aspen 5th ed 1998)
(suggesting that a settlement disposition is cheaper than a trial).
14 See, for example, Lynda Waddington, Culver on More Cuts to Judiciary Budget:
"Absolutely Not," Iowa Indep (Jan 14, 2010) (suggesting that during the recession "the
[Iowa] public should expect to wait longer for trial and hearing dates, and anticipate that
pressures to offer plea bargains will increase"), online at httpVf/iowaindependent.com
/25714/culver-on-more-cuts-to-judiciary-budget-absolutely-not (visited Oct 2, 2010).
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tails inquiry into the exact details of a plea agreement between a
prosecutor and co-conspiring witnesses. 15 These circuits suggest
that the defendant is generally able to expose the potential
biases of the co-conspiring witness without the disclosure of the
mandatory minimum sentence they would have been subjected to
if they had not entered into a plea agreement. 16 Additionally,
these circuits believe that the avoidance of prejudicing the jury
in regard to what sentence the defendant should receive, and
thus the avoidance of jury nullification, is a valid reason to cur-
tail cross-examination inquiry. 17 Part I.E-F details the Third and
Ninth Circuits' positions. In contrast to their sister circuits, these
circuits have held that the Confrontation Clause is violated when
a court prohibits the defendant from asking witnesses about
specific sentences they avoided by entering into a plea bargain.1 8
A. The First Circuit's Position
The First Circuit recently suggested that the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied if the defendant's counsel had an opportunity
to ask the co-conspiring witness if he or she had received or
hoped to receive a sentencing benefit from the prosecution in ex-
change for his or her testimony.' 9 In United States v Luciano-
Mosquera,20 the defendant Pagan-San-Miguel sought a new trial
or reversal of his guilty conviction for a firearms count related to
a conspiracy to import cocaine. Pagan-San-Miguel argued that
his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because the dis-
trict court cut off cross-examination into the exact penalties that
his co-conspirator-turned-government-witness, Castillo-Ramos,
would have faced on the firearms count, which was dropped
against him. The First Circuit denied that this cross-examination
limitation was an abuse of the trial court's discretion because of
the low probative value of information about the precise number
of years that Castillo-Ramos would have faced had he been
charged for the offense. The Circuit held that there was sufficient
evidence before the jury from which it could "make a discriminat-
ing appraisal of the possible biases and motivations of [Castillo-
15 See Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d 1142; Reid, 300 Fed Appx 50; Cropp, 127 F3d 354;
Arocho, 305 F3d 627.
16 See, for example, Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d at 1153.
17 See, for example, Cropp, 127 F3d at 358.
18 See Chandler, 326 F3d 210; Larson, 495 F3d 1094.
19 Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d at 1153.
20 63 F3d 1142 (1st Cir 1995).
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Ramos]." 21 In other words, the First Circuit found that any pro-
bative value of information about the precise number of years
that Castillo-Ramos would have faced absent government
cooperation was slight. Specifically, the First Circuit found that
the probative value of the precise number of years was out-
weighed by the potential for prejudice. The court feared that the
jury would be prejudiced if it learned how many years Castillo-
Ramos would have faced because the jury could infer that Pagan-
San-Miguel faced the same sentence.22 The court did not explicit-
ly state how learning of the defendant's sentence through infer-
ence would prejudice the jury, but it is reasonable to assume that
the court feared that the jury would nullify if it thought the sen-
tence was too harsh.
B. The Second Circuit's Position
The Second Circuit recently held that the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause was not violated when a district
court barred cross-examination regarding specific penalties a
cooperating witness would have faced had he not cooperated with
the government.23 The defendant in United States v Reid24 was
convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, five counts of robbery,
and five counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
crime. 25 Reid appealed his conviction in part because he alleged
that the trial court had improperly barred his cross-examination
of the government's cooperating witnesses. The Second Circuit
affirmed the guilty conviction after reviewing for abuse of dis-
cretion. Reid had elicited testimony from the cooperating wit-
nesses reflecting their incentive to lie and unearthing their past
criminal histories. The Second Circuit noted that the trial court
did not want to expose the jury to potentially prejudicial infor-
mation regarding sentencing.26 Again, the court did not specify
why this information would be prejudicial; perhaps the court was
concerned about the potential for jury nullification. Ultimately,
the Second Circuit offered very little analysis in Reid, but cited
the First Circuit's decision in Luciano-Mosquera approvingly. 27
21 Id, citing Brown v Powell, 975 F2d 1, 5 (1st Cir 1992).
22 Id at 1153.
23 See generally Reid, 300 Fed Appx 50.
24 300 Fed Appx 50 (2d Cir 2008).
25 Id at 51.
26 Id at 52.
27 Id.
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C. The Fourth Circuit's Position
The Fourth Circuit recently upheld a guilty conviction where
the district court limited the defendants' ability to cross-examine
government witnesses about the incentive to lie created by plea
agreements. 28 United States v Cropp29 concerned a cocaine con-
spiracy in which many of the government's witnesses were the
defendant's co-conspirators. The defense was allowed to ask co-
conspiring witnesses whether they had signed plea agreements,
whether they had faced a "severe penalty" prior to cooperating,
and whether they had expected to receive lesser sentences as a
result of their plea agreements. The defense was not allowed to
ask questions about the specific penalties that the witnesses
would have faced had they not cooperated with the government
or about the specific benefits they hoped to receive due to their
cooperation. The district court implied that asking witnesses
about the sentences they expected to receive would undermine
the court's discretion to ultimately decide those sentences.
Specifically, the court noted that the jury might nullify if it could
deduce the long sentences faced by the defendants from knowing
the sentences faced by their co-conspiring witnesses. 30
The defendants argued that the length of the possible
reduction in sentence was itself relevant to establish co-
conspiring witnesses' bias because "the greater a sentence faced
by a witness absent cooperation, the less believable the testimo-
ny of the witness."31 However, the Fourth Circuit specifically
sided with the First Circuit in Luciano-Mosquera, noting that
any probative value from the jury's knowledge of the number of
years faced by the witness absent cooperation was slight and not
worth the prejudicial impact. 32 The Fourth Circuit adopted the
First Circuit's standard: "[T]he proper inquiry for a reviewing
court is whether the jury possesses sufficient evidence to enable
it to make a 'discriminating appraisal' of bias and incentives to
lie on the part of the witnesses."33 The Fourth Circuit noted that
there was no reason to think that questions about exact sen-
tences feared or hoped for were necessary when the jury under-
28 See generally Cropp, 127 F3d 354.
29 127 F3d 354 (4th Cir 1997).
30 Id at 358.
31 Id at 359.
32 Id.
33 Cropp, 127 F3d at 359, citing Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d at 1153.
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stood that the witnesses were co-conspirators who would face
severe penalties if they did not testify for the government. 34
D. The Seventh Circuit's Position
The Seventh Circuit recently upheld cross-examination re-
strictions regarding the details of penalties co-conspiring wit-
nesses would have received absent cooperation with the govern-
ment.35 In United States v Arocho,36 co-conspirators Allen and
Hernandez were originally charged with numerous counts of
drug-related offenses. They entered into plea agreements in
which they agreed to testify against their co-conspirators (appel-
lants) in exchange for pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy.
At trial, Allen and Hernandez testified that the government had
dropped the drug-related charges against them in exchange for
their testimony implicating appellants. 37 The men told the jury
that they expected to receive a "substantial benefit" at their sen-
tencing in exchange for their testimony. 38 Appellants attempted
to cross-examine Allen and Hernandez about the details of the
specific sentences and sentencing guidelines ranges they faced.
The government filed a motion in limine to curtail the inquiry
and the district court granted the motion. The district court
feared that the jury would be prejudiced in regard to the sen-
tences appellants faced if they learned of the sentences faced by
their co-conspirators absent government cooperation. 39
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in barring cross-examination about the
specific guidelines range and sentences because the jury learned
that Allen and Hernandez expected to receive substantial
benefits for their testimony.40 The Seventh Circuit emphasized
the importance of the district court judge's jury instruction,
which indicated that the jury should consider Allen and
Hernandez's testimony with great care because of the benefits
the men expected to receive. 41 Finally, the Seventh Circuit held
that the district court's concern that the jury would be able to
infer the sentences faced by the appellants by hearing about the
31 See Cropp, 127 F3d at 359.
35 See generally Arocho, 305 F3d 627.
36 Id at 635.
37 Id at 635-36.
38 Id at 636.
39 Arocho, 305 F3d at 636.
40 Id.
41 T.3
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sentences faced by their co-conspirators Allen and Hernandez
was valid.42 In other words, the Seventh Circuit found that the
potential for jury nullification outweighed any benefit that
the jury would receive by understanding the specific versus
general benefits the witnesses received by cooperating with the
government.
E. The Third Circuit's Position
In United States v Chandler,43 the Third Circuit overturned
the defendant Chandler's drug conspiracy conviction, finding
that the trial court's decision to bar certain cross-examination
testimony regarding the penalties faced by the co-conspiring wit-
nesses violated Chandler's rights pursuant to the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 44 Two co-conspirators testified
against Chandler, one who had already received a sentence re-
duction in exchange for his testimony, and one who had been
promised a reduction of her sentence in exchange for her testi-
mony.45 During Chandler's trial a co-conspirator, Sylvester, ad-
mitted that he was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement be-
tween himself and the government. Sylvester admitted that he
had agreed to plead guilty to charges of selling three ounces of
cocaine, to cooperate with law enforcement agents, and to active-
ly work with them to indentify and apprehend the leader of the
drug conspiracy (not Chandler). In exchange the government
overlooked the fact that Sylvester had dealt with about five kilo-
grams of cocaine rather than three ounces of cocaine. 46 The other
government witness, Yearwood, had not been sentenced before
Chandler's trial. On direct examination she admitted that she
had pleaded guilty to trafficking in between fifteen and fifty kilo-
grams of cocaine, and had agreed to assist the government in
ongoing drug investigations by wearing a wire during meetings
with drug dealers. She testified that she hoped her cooperation
would result in the government reducing her sentence.47 The
trial court barred Chandler's counsel from asking Sylvester or
Yearwood about the difference between the sentences they would
42 Id.
43 326 F3d 210 (3d Cir 2003).
44 See generally Chandler, 326 F3d 210.
45 Id at 216.
46 Id at 216-17.
47 Id at 217.
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have received absent cooperation and the sentences they either
had received or hoped to receive as a result of cooperation. 48
The Third Circuit held that Chandler's Confrontation Clause
rights were violated because she was not able to effectively ex-
pose the witnesses' potential biases and motivations for testify-
ing against her and because the limitations did not fall within
the "reasonable limits" which the district court was authorized to
impose on the defendant's right to cross-examine. 49 The Third
Circuit first considered whether the district court inhibited
Chandler from inquiring into the witnesses' motives to testify,
concluding that "a reasonable jury could have reached a signifi-
cantly different impression of Sylvester's and Yearwood's credi-
bility had it been apprised of the enormous magnitude of their
stake in testifying against Chandler."50 The Third Circuit next
considered whether the district court's limitation of cross-
examination fell within the District Court's discretion to impose
"reasonable limits" on a defendant's right of cross-examination. 51
The government asserted that the interest in restricting the
defense counsel's inquiry stemmed from a fear of jury nullifica-
tion, but the Third Circuit held that such an interest was out-
weighed by Chandler's right to confront witnesses against her.5 2
Lastly, the Third Circuit considered whether the conviction
should nevertheless be affirmed pursuant to the harmless error
doctrine, and concluded that the sentence should be vacated be-
cause the error was not harmless. 53
F. The Ninth Circuit's Position
In United States v Larson,54 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, found that the defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause had been violated when they were barred from question-
ing their co-conspiring witnesses about the mandatory minimum
sentences that the witnesses would have received had they not
testified.55 Defendants were each charged with one count of con-
spiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
The government approached defendants' co-conspirator, Lamere,
48 See Chandler, 326 F3d at 218.
49 Id at 222-23.
50 Id at 222 (quotation marks omitted).
51 See id at 219.
52 Chandler, 326 F3d at 223.
53 Id at 224.
54 495 F3d 1094 (9th Cir 2007).
55 Larson, 495 F3d at 1094.
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and informed him that he faced a statutory mandatory minimum
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
because he had at least two prior felony drug convictions.
Lamere and another conspirator, Poitra, entered into plea
agreements and agreed to testify against defendants in exchange
for the government's agreement to file motions for reduced sen-
tences.5 6 On direct examination, Lamere testified that he had
pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine and that he testified in hopes that he would
receive a reduced sentence.57 On direct examination Poitra
admitted to being charged with conspiring to possess metham-
phetamine with intent to distribute and to cooperating with the
expectation that the government would move to reduce her sen-
tence. She further testified that she expected to face at least five
years of prison time if she did not cooperate with the govern-
ment, before the prosecutor objected to the testimony.58 The dis-
trict court sustained the objection but did not strike Poitra's tes-
timony. 59 The district court refused to allow Larson's counsel to
cross-examine Lamere about the sentence he would have faced
had he not cooperated with the government because the court
noted that the sentencing of a defendant was up to the court to
decide.60 Presumably, the district court feared that the jury
would nullify if it understood how much time Lamere faced be-
cause it would be able to deduce how much time defendants
faced. The Ninth Circuit originally upheld the conviction, reason-
ing that the Confrontation Clause was not violated. But sitting
en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed its original decision with re-
gard to the Sixth Amendment issue (while upholding defendants'
convictions because the district court's error was harmless).61
The Ninth Circuit considered three factors in determining
whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause right to cross-
examination was violated: (1) whether the excluded evidence was
relevant; (2) whether there were other legitimate interests out-
weighing the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence; and
(3) whether the exclusion of evidence left the jury with sufficient
information to assess the credibility of the witness.6 2 This test
56 Id at 1097.
57 Id at 1098.
58 Id.
59 Larson, 495 F3d at 1103.
60 Id at 1104.
61 Id at 1096.
62 Id at 1103, citing United States v Beardslee, 197 F3d 378, 383 (9th Cir 1999).
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roughly implements Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The Ninth
Circuit held that Poitra's incentive to testify for the government
had been sufficiently exposed and so there was no Confrontation
Clause error.63 However, the Circuit held that Lamere's incentive
to testify had not been sufficiently exposed because he faced a
mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment in the ab-
sence of cooperation with the prosecution. The Ninth Circuit
found that this excluded evidence was relevant to assessing La-
mere's testimony because "the mandatory nature of the potential
sentence, the length of the sentence, and the witness' obvious
motivation to avoid such a sentence cast considerable doubt on
the believability of the witness' testimony."64 The Ninth Circuit
further suggested that the proffered interest of the trial court in
barring the testimony was insufficient. While the Ninth Circuit
found that the jury was able to get a sense that Lamere was tes-
tifying in exchange for some benefit, the fact that the jury was
not able to learn of the magnitude of the benefit received was
inadequate under the Confrontation Clause.65 It is not clear from
the opinion whether the court held that Poitra's incentive to tes-
tify had been exposed because, even though the objection was
sustained, the minimum sentence length (five years) was low
whereas a minimum of life is high, or if they held that her incen-
tive to testify had been exposed because the judge did not strike
her testimony from the record. It is probably the case that the
court thought the fact that the judge did not strike her testimony
from the record sufficiently exposed her motive to testify, be-
cause the court wrote:
Where a plea agreement allows for some benefit or detri-
ment to flow to a witness as a result of his testimony, the
defendant must be permitted to cross-examine the wit-
ness sufficiently to make clear to the jury what benefit or
detriment will flow, and what will trigger the benefit or
detriment, to show why the witness might testify falsely
in order to gain the benefit or avoid the detriment. 66
Ultimately the Court held that a "reasonable jury might
have received a significantly different impression of [Lamere's]
63 Larson, 495 F3d at 1103.
64 Id at 1104.
65 Id at 1105.
66 Id (emphasis added), citing United States v Schoneberg, 396 F3d 1036, 1042 (9th
Cir 2005).
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credibility had ... counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed
line of cross-examination."67 However, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Confrontation Clause error was harmless
because the government's case against defendants was strong
even without Lamere's testimony.68
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Part II of this Comment argues that the Sixth Amendment
is violated when inquiry into the specific details of the plea bar-
gain is curtailed. Part II.A examines whether the split could be
resolved by adopting the majority perspective advocated by the
First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, and concludes that
the split should not be resolved in such a manner. Part II.B ex-
amines whether the split could be resolved by reading the Third
and Ninth Circuit's holdings in United States v Larson and
United States v Chandler narrowly, and concludes that the split
should not be resolved in such a manner. Part II.C argues that
the Sixth Amendment requires inquiry into the specific details of
the plea bargain. Specifically, I suggest that the circuits have not
sufficiently balanced the probative value of evidence against the
harm of prejudice, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
The circuits have not fully considered whether jury nullification
is a significant harm; instead the circuits have assumed, without
analysis, that jury nullification is a prejudicial harm. Moreover,
the circuits have excessively focused on the probative value as-
pect of the jury's understanding of the witnesses' incentives to
cooperate, to the detriment of analyzing the jury nullification
aspect. Finally, I argue that my solution saves costs because it is
a bright-line rule that gives certainty to courts, reducing the time
that judges spend weighing this issue, reducing the work on ap-
pellate courts, and reducing the work for government prosecutors
during appeals.
A. Majority Perspective
The First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have held
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated when a judge cur-
tails inquiry into the exact details of a plea agreement between a
prosecutor and co-conspiring witnesses.69 These circuits have
67 Larson, 495 F3d at 1106, citing Van Arsdall, 475 US at 680.
68 See Larson, 495 F3d at 1108.
69 See Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d 1142; Reid, 300 Fed Appx 50; United States v
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suggested that the magnitude of the reduction in sentence gar-
nered by a plea agreement has little probative value. 70 However,
the obvious critique of this finding is the fact that the magnitude
of the reduction seems quite probative. It seems fair to assume,
for example, that a conspiring witness might not be honest with
the prosecution in exchange for a two-year reduction, but might
testify honestly in exchange for a fifteen-year reduction. More-
over, a jury often has no context in which to evaluate testimony
where the witness alleges that he or she is receiving a considera-
ble or substantial benefit from the government in exchange for
his or her testimony. In other words, a jury might not under-
stand what a "considerable" or "substantial" benefit is, whereas
the meaning of "considerable" or "substantial" may be clear to a
judge. These circuits do not offer any analysis as to how juries
should process the general information that the witness entered
into a plea agreement with the government. Rather, the proba-
tive value of such evidence attaches when the jury is given de-
tailed information about how the witness benefits by testifying
against the defendant.
Additionally, these circuits have held that the avoidance of
prejudicing the jury in regard to what sentence the defendant
should receive, and thus avoiding jury nullification, is a valid
reason to curtail cross-examination inquiry. However, these cir-
cuits do not offer any normative reasons why jury nullification
should be considered harmful, nor do they explain whether jury
nullification actually occurs in this context.
B. A Narrow Reading of the Minority Perspective
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Larson might be limited to
cases in which the cooperating witness faces a mandatory sen-
tence in the absence of a motion by the government. In contrast,
Larson may not apply in cases where cooperating witnesses face
potential maximum sentences, rather than mandatory minimum
sentences. 71 The reconciliation of the circuit split in this way has
legal support. The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish its
decision in Larson from United States v Cropp on such grounds
because Cropp only involved the exclusion of testimony regarding
Cropp, 127 F3d 354; United States v Arocho, 305 F3d 627.
70 See, for example, Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F3d at 1153.
71 See Larson, 495 F3d at 1106 ("The potential maximum statutory sentence that a
cooperating witness might receive, however, is fundamentally different from the manda-
tory minimum sentence that the witness will receive in the absence of a motion by the
Government.") (emphasis in original).
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the potential sentence that the witness faced in the absence of
cooperation with the government.7 2
However, the Ninth Circuit in Larson cited United States v
Chandler approvingly, suggesting that the holding is not limited
to cases involving cooperating witnesses facing mandatory sen-
tences. 73 The cooperating witnesses in Chandler faced severe
sentences absent government cooperation, but did not face life
sentences or mandatory sentences. 74 Second, reconciling the split
in this way would mean that the probative value of the jury
knowing that a witness is subject to a mandatory sentence out-
weighs the prejudice this information produces. In contrast, the
probative value of the jury knowing that a witness is subject to a
potential maximum sentence would not outweigh the prejudice
this information produces. In sum, under this approach a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated when a judge
curtails questions regarding a witness's potential mandatory
sentence but not when a judge curtails questions regarding a
witness's potential maximum sentence.
This rule suggests that the probative value of plea bargain
details in situations where the co-conspiring witness would have
faced a mandatory sentence but not a discretionary sentence
should outweigh the harm of prejudice, in this case jury nullifica-
tion. This logic seems questionable. For example, a mandatory
sentence could be lower than a potential sentence; thus, a co-
conspiring witness might have an incentive to lie when facing a
high potential sentence but not when facing a low mandatory
sentence. Contrary to what this approach predicts, the probative
value would be greater in this high potential sentence context,
rather than in this low mandatory sentence context. Further-
more, the prejudicial impact of jury nullification is contingent on
how high the sentence is and not whether the sentence is manda-
tory or discretionary, assuming juries nullify when they believe
the sentence to be too harsh.75 But a jury is no more likely to
72 Larson, 495 F3d at 1106 n 12, citing Cropp, 127 F3d at 359.
73 Larson, 495 F3d at 1107, citing Chandler, 326 F3d at 222.
71 Chandler, 326 F3d at 222 (Sylvester pleaded guilty to an offense with a twelve- to
eighteen-month Guidelines sentencing range and received only one month of house arrest
and probation when he could have been charged with a greater offense; Yearwood faced a
Guidelines minimum sentence of upwards of twelve years and testified that she expected
the government to move for a reduced sentence in exchange for her testimony.).
75 See Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury about Man-
datory Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum L Rev 1232, 1233 (1995) ("[The] criminal jury,
through its nullification power, is intended to function ... as a political check on the
government's power to promulgate unpopular laws and overly harsh punishments.").
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nullify when a mandatory sentence is low than when a potential
sentence is low. In sum, there is nothing inherent about a
mandatory sentence versus a discretionary sentence that should
affect the probative/prejudice balance required by Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.
Moreover, the circuit split should not be resolved by reading
the Ninth and Third Circuits' holdings narrowly to suggest that
the Sixth Amendment is not violated when inquiry into plea bar-
gain details is curtailed in situations where the benefit received
by agreeing to cooperate is marginal. But this solution has some
legal support. In United States v Larson, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plicitly adopted the Third Circuit's central holding in United
States v Chandler: the Sixth Amendment is violated when the
jury cannot properly ascertain the magnitude of the witnesses'
incentives to lie, which sometimes requires exposing the details
of the witnesses' plea bargains.76 The Third Circuit has implied
that Chandler should be read narrowly:
The circumstances of the present case do not require us to
resolve whether the Confrontation Clause entitles a de-
fendant categorically to inquire into the "concrete terms"
of a cooperating witness's agreement with the govern-
ment, including the specific sentence that witness may
have avoided through his cooperation. Rather, we need
only decide whether, if the trial court had not prohibited
Chandler from cross-examining Sylvester and Kathleen
Yearwood with respect to the magnitude of the sentence
reduction they believed they had earned, or would earn,
through their testimony, the jury might have "received a
significantly different impression of [their] credibility."77
It remains unclear whether the Third Circuit and the Ninth Cir-
cuit will always find that the Confrontation Clause has been vio-
lated in cases where the trial court bars cross-examination about
specific penalties cooperating witnesses face. At best, these cases
suggest that no Confrontation Clause violation occurs when the
trial court bars cross-examination about specific penalties faced
by cooperating witnesses in cases where the sentence reduction
earned by the cooperating witness is marginal.
However, a major critique of this approach is that it is un-
clear what it means for a sentence reduction to be marginal. For
76 See Larson, 495 F3d at 1107, citing Chandler, 326 F3d at 222.
77 Chandler, 326 F3d at 221, citing Van Arsdall, 475 US at 680.
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example, in United States v Cropp the co-conspiring witnesses
would have faced sentences of between ten and twenty years in
prison if they had not cooperated with the government. 78 The
plea-bargained sentence reduction for the conspiring witnesses is
not clear from the record because the trial court did not allow
specific questions regarding the benefit received. However, ten to
twenty years might be considered a severe sentence that defen-
dants would want to avoid, and the incentive to lie would emerge
assuming that the prosecutor agreed to reduce the sentence even
by a year. The Chandler co-conspiring witnesses faced less initial
time in prison than did those in Cropp, yet, unlike the Fourth
Circuit in Cropp, the Third Circuit in Chandler held that the
jury needed to be told the exact details of co-conspiring witness-
es' plea agreements so as to appreciate the increased incentives
to lie based on the magnitude of the benefits received.79 Thus, it
does not seem possible to resolve the circuit split based on the
magnitude of benefit received by the co-conspiring witness in
exchange for testimony against the defendant.
C. Proposed Solution
District judges might be concerned that a discussion of sen-
tences will impinge on the court's discretion to impose a sen-
tence. In particular, a discussion of mandatory minimums that
co-conspirators face for the same crime that the defendant stands
trial for may result in jury nullification, because a discussion of
what will be in store for the defendant, should the jury find him
or her guilty, could cause the jury to acquit. Here, the concern is
that the potential for jury nullification outweighs the probative
value of the information received through forcing a witness to
reveal the details of his or her plea agreement.80
The problem of considering jury nullification to be a prejudi-
cial impact is a two-fold inquiry. First, empirically, do juries
nullify rather than finding defendants guilty when they know
that their co-conspirators face high sentences? Juries first must
deduce that the sentence faced by the co-conspirator is the same
sentence faced by the defendant, which is not always the case.
Moreover, it is impossible to determine whether juries acquit
7 Cropp, 127 F3d at 359.
79 Chandler, 326 F3d at 222.
80 Consider Cropp, 127 F3d at 358 ("The district court was also concerned that if the
jury could infer the very long sentences faced by the appellants from knowing the sen-
tences faced by the conspirators, the jury members would hesitate to find the appellants
guilty even if the evidence proved their guilt.").
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defendants because they believe that there is not enough
evidence to convict or because they find the high sentence to be
distasteful.81 The majority perspective is that nullification is a
rare problem.82 Moreover, our judicial system is based on an
assumption that juries are able to do their jobs properly.8 3
But perhaps more importantly, is jury nullification in the
context of sentencing harmful? At least one author notes that
judges have oftentimes informed the jury of sentencing faced by
the defendant, suggesting that the law implicitly allows for and
encourages nullification in this context.8 4 It is worth discussing
the justification for and historical origins of jury nullification in
order to determine whether it is harmful in the FRE 403 balanc-
ing context. The history of jury nullification is richly detailed in a
federal district court opinion, United States v Polizzi.85 According
to presiding Judge Weinstein, the Supreme Court has revitalized
an originalist method of interpreting the Sixth Amendment in
recent years. Thus, lower federal courts are required to recognize
"a basic element of the Sixth Amendment as originally under-
stood: the jury of the vicinage, being aware of the sentencing im-
plications of a finding of guilt, had the frequently exercised
power to refuse to follow the law as construed by the court, and
could acquit or downgrade the crime in order to avoid a sentence
81 There is a lack of rigorous empirical evidence on jury nullification. However, there
is some anecdotal evidence that jury nullification occurs more frequently in communities
of color where a disproportionately high number of minorities face criminal charges. See
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 105 Yale L J 677, 679-80 (1995) (noting that some black jurors may vote to acquit
black defendants on the basis of race).
82 See Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 130-49 (Plenum Press
1986) (suggesting that empirical studies indicate that the modern American jury does not
often nullify, but rather generally bases its verdict on the evidence and faithfully at-
tempts to follow legal principles given by the judge).
83 Id at 251 ("Our final judgment on the jury system is a positive one. Despite some
flaws, it serves the cause of justice very well. For over 700 years it has weathered criti-
cism and attack, always to survive and to be cherished by the peoples who own it. Adapt-
ability has been the key to its survival. It should remain open to experimentation and
modification, but those who would wish to curtail its powers or abolish it should bear the
burden of proof. Defenders of the jury clearly have the weight of the evidence on their
side."). But see Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U Chi L
Rev 386 (1954) (questioning the ability of the jury to fulfill its fact-finding role); Stephan
Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44
Hastings L J 579, 581 (1993) (stating that "in the early twentieth century the jury was
subjected to some of the sharpest criticism in its long history").
84 See Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges
Can Avoid Imposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 Am J Crim L 1, 18-27 (2008).
85 549 F Supp 2d 308, 322-23 (EDNY 2008), vacd United States v Polouizzi, 564 F3d
142 (2d Cir 2009).
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it deemed excessive."86 Judge Weinstein suggested that, not only
is it permissible for a jury to nullify based on knowledge of a
mandatory sentence, but that such nullification might be
required.8 7 In fact, in Polizzi, Weinstein concluded that the trial
court had impermissibly violated the Sixth Amendment when it
denied a defendant's request to inform the jury of the statutory
mandatory five-year minimum applicable to the charges he
faced. Weinstein ordered a new trial in which the jury would be
required to inform the jury of the mandatory sentence the
defendant faced.88
However, Polizzi was overturned by the Second Circuit, par-
tially because it found that there is no Sixth Amendment right to
an instruction on the applicable mandatory minimum sentence. 89
Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the district court was
bound to follow its prior precedent, United States v Pabon-Cruz.90
Pabon-Cruz was decided in the wake of Shannon v United
States.91 In Shannon, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that an instruction on the sentencing consequences of the jury's
verdict was "required as a matter of general federal criminal
practice." 92 The Court in Shannon, the Second Circuit in Pabon-
Cruz noted, "left open the possibility that it might be 'necessary
under certain limited circumstances' to instruct a jury regarding
the sentencing consequences of its verdict," but the Second Cir-
cuit held that the mandatory minimum circumstances in Pabon-
Cruz were not among the "limited circumstances" in which such
an instruction might be required.9 3
Weinstein's opinion that jury nullification is a positive is
not without opposition. In State v Ragland, 94 a trial judge in-
structed the jury that it must also find the defendant guilty of a
86 Id at 322.
87 Id ("The complexity of modern United States criminal law and the general public's
lack of detailed knowledge of federal statutory provisions require that, in the few cases
where necessary, the jury be informed of such matters as the required minimum term of
incarceration that will follow from its verdict so that it can exercise its constitutionally
mandated historic role. Cases which have rejected this view, on the ground that it per-
mits a form of impermissible 'nullification,' have not followed the Sixth Amendment as it
must be interpreted after recent Supreme Court originalist holdings.").
88 Id at 323.
89 See Polouizzi, 564 F3d at 160.
90 391 F3d 86, 94-95 (2d Cir 2004) ("[D]efendant had no legal right to a charge in-
forming the jury of the sentencing consequences of its decisions.").
91 512 US 573 (1994).
92 See id at 584-85.
93 See Pabon-Cruz, 391 F3d at 95.
94 105 NJ 189 (1986).
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possession charge if it found that the defendant had a weapon
during the commission of a robbery. The defendant appealed his
conviction, on the grounds that the word "must" conflicted with
the jury's nullification powers, and demanded that the jurors be
instructed of their nullification rights. The New Jersey Supreme
Court emphatically held that the power of jury nullification is
not an essential component of the Sixth Amendment and upheld
the conviction. 95 The Court further suggested that jury nullifica-
tion is "undesirable" because "only our elected representatives
may determine what is a crime and what is not, and only they
may revise that law if it is found to be unfair or imprecise; only
they and not twelve people whose names are picked at random
from the box."96 The Court also noted that jury nullification led
to cynicism towards the justice system and completely arbitrary
results. Finally, the Court concluded that jury nullification
violated the rule of law.97 Judge Weinstein and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey's differing opinions toward jury nullification
seem to reflect dissimilar first principles: each thinks of the com-
parative institutional capacities of the jury and the legislature in
different ways. Judge Weinstein seems to believe that juries will
make just (non-arbitrary) decisions and nullify when enforce-
ment of the legislature's law will lead to an egregious outcome.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey seems to believe
that juries' decisions will be arbitrary and legislatures' decisions
will be well thought out and representative.
This analysis calls into question whether jury nullification is
as harmful as some courts make it out to be. Ultimately, the cir-
cuit split could be resolved by requiring courts to avoid the po-
tential for jury nullification by taking steps that would not impli-
cate the Confrontation Clause. For example, recently judges have
increased judicial control over jurors by issuing authoritative
jury instructions. 98 A host of cases suggests that judges can per-
95 Id at 201-02.
96 Id at 205.
97 Id at 208-09 ('The fundamental defect in jury nullification is obvious. It is a power
that is absolutely inconsistent with the most important value of Western democracy, that
we should live under a government of laws and not of men .... With jury nullification,
these free people are told, either explicitly or implicitly, that they are the law, that what
the sovereign has pronounced ahead of time either may or may not be followed, and that
if they want to, they may convict every poor man and acquit every rich man; convict the
political opponent but free the crony; put the long-haired in jail but the crew-cut on the
street; imprison the black and free the white; or, even more arbitrarily, just do what they
please whenever they please.").
98 See B. Michael Dann, 'Must Find the Defendant Guilty" Jury Instructions Violate
the Sixth Amendment, 91 Judicature 12 (2007) (noting that a "survey of the states' and
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missibly discourage nullification.99 A judge should also consider
that empirical data suggests jury nullification is rare 00 when
comparing its prejudicial harm to the probative value generated
from the jury learning about the exact sentences faced by the
witness in absence of government cooperation. In sum, the bal-
ancing test set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 suggests that
the rule should disfavor the majority perspective because the
probative value of and need for evidence about the incentives of
the witnesses outweighs the harm of nullification, which is un-
likely to result from its admission.
The major critique of this argument is that such a rule will
decrease the incentive to plea bargain. In turn, this could further
burden the workload for the district court, the appellate court,
and the attorneys, which is problematic especially in these trou-
bling economic times. Moreover, given the current federal prose-
cutors' focus on financial crimes, prosecutors need to be able to
use tools that are inexpensive and efficient like plea bargains in
non-financial crime contexts, like the drug context discussed
throughout this Comment. Furthermore, a rule preventing
defense counsel from questioning the co-conspiring witness about
the exact benefit he or she received through the plea may lead to
more plea agreements, which will further the government's pros-
ecution abilities by freeing up judicial resources that would
otherwise have to be spent on a trial. Presumably prosecutors
will be less likely to offer a plea to a co-conspiring witness if the
trial court does not bar cross-examination about specific benefit
received. The prosecutors object because they fear that their wit-
ness will look less credible to a jury and the jury will be less like-
ly to convict the defendant.
I present three counterarguments to this critique. First, hav-
ing a bright-line rule can decrease costs through certainty. 10 1 A
federal circuits' corresponding jury instruction language reveals that 24, almost 40 per-
cent, of state courts and federal circuits use the command 'must' or its equivalent ('shall'
or 'duty') to point to verdicts of guilty when all of the elements of the alleged crime have
been proven. Another 7, or 13 percent, use the milder admonition 'should' to steer the
jury's decision to guilt.").
99 See United States v Thomas, 116 F3d 606 (2d Cir 1997) (ruling that jurors can be
removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law, under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 23(b)); United States v Krzyske, 836 F2d 1013 (6th Cir 1988) (uphold-
ing defendant's conviction on appeal after the jury convicted the defendant after asking
the judge about jury nullification, and the judge responded, "There is no such thing as
valid jury nullification"); United States v Dougherty, 473 F2d 1113 (DC Cir 1972) (affirm-
ing the de facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upholding the denial of jury instruc-
tions about the power to nullify).
100 See Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 130-49 (cited in note 82).
101 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
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bright-line rule gives certainty to courts, reducing the time that
judges spend weighing this issue, reducing the work on appeals
courts, and reducing the work for government prosecutors during
appeals. My solution makes it clear ex ante that the Con-
frontation Clause is violated if a trial court curtails inquiry into
the specific details of a co-conspiring witnesses' plea agreement
with the government. Resolving the circuit split in favor of the
majority perspective will result in a standard. The Supreme
Court has previously held that trial courts cannot curtail all in-
quiry into a witness's motivation to lie. 10 2 This means that if the
circuit split is resolved in favor of the circuits that have held that
the Sixth Amendment is not necessarily violated if a trial court
curtails inquiry, the question remains, when is the Sixth
Amendment violated? The answer becomes case specific, and the
uncertainty that remains will encourage appeals, which in turn
might increase costs and burden federal prosecutors.
Second, a standard of leaving the choice to a judge to curtail
or allow cross-examination wastes resources. At the margin, the
increased value of the testimony in cases where the judge cur-
tails cross-examination will increase the value of the bargain for
prosecutors. The problem is that the prosecutor cannot predict
the value of the testimony because he or she does not know how
the trial judge will rule, or whether the decision will be a ground
for appeal. The prosecutor wastes time trying to figure out the
probability that the bargain will be valuable to the government,
which also increases the costs of negotiation. The prosecutor
loses the value he or she bargained away to secure the less valu-
able testimony if he or she guesses wrong. The prosecutor might
value the testimony less and secure more jail time for the co-
conspirator if he or she knew all along whether the plea bargain
terms would be revealed to the jury. Thus, public resources could
be spent more efficiently in terms of jail time per dollar. A
bright-line rule is created only if the circuit split is resolved in
favor of holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated where
trial judges curtail cross-examination regarding plea bargains of
co-conspiring witnesses. A standard is created if the circuit split
is resolved in favor of holding that the Sixth Amendment is not
necessarily violated where trial judges curtail inquiry. This is
because the question remains as to how much and in what con-
text a trial judge can curtail inquiry without running afoul of the
Duke L J 557 (1992).
102 See Davis, 415 US at 315.
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Sixth Amendment. Creating certainty for the prosecutor in re-
gard to the value created by the testimony of a co-conspiring wit-
ness will better save judicial resources as the prosecutor will
know how to value a plea bargain.
Third, the circuits that have held that the Sixth Amendment
is not violated when the defense is barred from asking about the
details of plea agreements premise their decisions on the idea
that revealing the specific benefit received has little probative
value and high prejudicial value in the form of jury nullification.
For prosecutors and defenders of broad prosecutorial power, the
jury nullification concern may be a proxy for another concern.
Namely, the concern might be that requiring the jury to hear the
exact details of plea bargains will make witnesses look less
credible to a jury and the jury will be less likely to convict the
defendant. However, it is troubling if this is the actual concern.
The Constitution is simply not concerned with whether a prose-
cutor's incentive to offer the plea is diminished. The fact that the
prosecutor objects to the cross-examination because they fear
that their witness will look less credible to a jury and the jury
will be less likely to convict the defendant goes to the heart of the
Confrontation Clause itself.
CONCLUSION
There is a split of authority among the circuit courts as to
whether the Sixth Amendment demands that a co-conspirator of
the defendant admit the exact details of his or her plea agree-
ment in court, thus allowing the jury to make inferences regard-
ing whether the witness had an incentive to cooperate with the
government and perhaps lie in exchange for a reduced sentence.
This Comment rejects the majority position of the circuits
that all the Sixth Amendment demands is that the witness admit
that he or she has benefited by cooperating with the government.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 403, demand
that courts balance the probative value of and need for certain
evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission.
The majority of circuits simply have not engaged properly in the
probative/prejudice balance by assuming without analysis that
jury nullification is a problem and that plea details have little
probative value. This Comment also rejects the logic proffered by
those circuits that have held the Sixth Amendment requires wit-
nesses to discuss details of their plea agreements. These circuits
overly focus on the probative value of the testimony, without dis-
cussing the prejudice aspect of the FRE 403 equation. This
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Comment has suggested an alternative solution with explicit
reference to FRE 403. Namely, judges should minimize the rare
occurrence of jury nullification by taking steps that do not
implicate the Confrontation Clause. Judges should find that the
harm of jury nullification is low and is easily outweighed by the
probative value of evidence regarding a co-conspiring witness's
incentive to cooperate.
4
